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Abstract 
 
In 2010, R. T. Erdoğan publicly acknowledged that he does not believe in equality between 
women and men. Following the subsequent general election in 2011, Erdoğan has solidified his 
power first as Prime Minister and, since August 2014, as the President of Turkey. Thus, his 
patriarchal and Islamist discourse on women has become stronger and more visible. The more 
powerful Erdoğan has become, the wider his discourse on women has been appreciated by the 
society. His discourse has started to reinforce women’s ‘place’ in society both in public and 
private spheres. This article examines Erdoğan’s speeches between August 2014 and August 
2019, focusing on International Women’s Day (8th of March), Mothers’ Day (second Sunday of 
May), and International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women (25th of 
November) using the framework of ‘Logic of Misogyny’ (Kate Manne 2019) to determine to 
what extent patterns of misogyny inform Erdoğan’s discourse on women’s rights, equality and 
agency. In order to deconstruct Erdoğan’s discourse and analyse the relationship between 
discourse and misogyny, this article adopts feminist critical discourse analysis (FCDA) as the 
research method. In doing so, the article aims to contribute to the literature on both FCDA and 
misogyny with a study focusing on Turkey. 
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1. Introduction  
 
«Democracy is like a bus ride. Once you reach your destination, you get off»
1
. 
R. T. Erdoğan 
 
So he did. Following the 2011 general election, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has solidified 
his power as a leader and shifted the political trajectory of his party, Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) to authoritarianism with an evident Islamic character
2
. In 
2014, he was elected the president of Turkey and following the referendum of 2017, the 
parliamentary system has changed to an executive presidency. From 2018 onwards, 
Erdoğan has been the head of the executive and head of the state, while retaining his 
position as the leader of the AKP. 
Since the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, Turkish society has always 
assigned substantial power to its political leaders
3
. Their discourses are widely accepted 
by society, as political discourse is powerful in shaping the mindsets of people. 
Tekinalp stresses that political leaders give speeches not only to address electors in 
order to hold power but also to appeal to the electors’ sociocognitive mental frame, 
cultural and ideological background, and current social situations
4
.  
The extant literature covers previous studies examining Erdoğan’s discourse on a 
variety of topics including the gender politics of the AKP while Erdoğan was still prime 
minister. However, to date there is no study using logic of misogyny as a framework 
and focusing explicitly on Erdoğan’s presidential speeches concerning women. I argue 
that it is necessary to study misogyny and FCDA in countries where regimes have 
transformed into authoritarianism because women are suppressed on a different and 
deeper level than men by authoritarian regimes. Therefore, in this article, I aim to 
answer to what extent patterns of misogyny inform Erdoğan’s discourse on women and 
their ‘place’ in society while Turkey goes through an agenda of authoritarianism, 
nationalism and Islamisation.  
This article focuses on Erdoğan’s discourses (August 2014 - August 2019) 
concerning International Women’s Day, Mothers’ Day, and the International Day for 
the Elimination of Violence against Women (VAW). To address the research question, 
27 speeches by Erdoğan and press releases of the presidency on behalf of Erdoğan are 
analysed. Theoretically, I focus on the framework of logic of misogyny
5
 and FCDA as 
the research method. This article has been structured into five sections: Section 1 
consists of the introduction; Section 2 reviews the existing literature, looking at 
previous studies focusing on the AKP and gender; Section 3 sets out the theoretical and 
methodological framework; and Sections 4 and 5 present the findings of the research in 
the discussion and conclusion, respectively. The first subsection of section 4 focuses on 
                                              
1
 Online archive of the newspaper Milliyet, 14 July 1996, Page 20, 
http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/Arsiv/1996/07/14. 
2
 E. Özbudun, AKP at the Crossroads: Erdoğan's Majoritarian Drift, in South European Society and 
Politics, 19, 2, 2014, pp. 155-167. 
3
 B. Kesgin, Turkey’s Erdoğan: Leadership Style and Foreign Policy Audiences, in Turkish Studies, 2019. 
4
 Ş. Tekinalp, How to Conceptualize a Culture of Support Through “Language Plus” Presented at the 
Right Time to the Right Audience, in International Journal of Communication, No. 12, 2018, pp. 4313-
4331. 
5
 K. Manne, Down Girl the Logic of Misogyny, Penguin Books, London, 2019.  
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the relationship between patriarchy and misogyny and how Erdoğan’s discourse 
operates in upholding patriarchal order, while the second moves to describe in greater 
details othering, and forms a further relationship between Erdoğan’s discourse and 
misogyny. In doing so, I aim to contribute to the literature on both misogyny and FCDA 
with a study focusing on Turkey. The study concludes that the patterns of misogyny are 
highly detectable in Erdoğan’s discourse on women’s rights, equality and agency.  
 
2. Literature Review  
 
Research on discourse and power has a long history; therefore, literature screening 
on the discourse of political leaders reveals a significant body of research. For example, 
some analysts have examined the rhetorical space of the Bush administration in the 
United States (US) following 9/11. Drawing on six speeches given by former US 
President George W. Bush, Merskin stresses “enemy construction” through using 
interpretive textual analysis
6
 while Krebs and Lobasz traced the development of 
rhetorical coercion that left no space between Iraq and “the war on terror” while 
demonsrating a series of binaries such as evil/good, us/them, self/others
7
.  
A large and growing body of literature has investigated discourse and gender politics 
under the various AKP governments: these include studies that focused on gender 
policies and/or discourse on gender
8
; leadership traits
9
; discourse in party politics
10
, 
discourse in election speeches
11
; discourse on refugees
12
 and discourse in mass media
13
. 
                                              
6
 D. Merskin, The Construction of Arabs as Enemies: Post-September 11 Discourse of George W. Bush 
Mass Communication & Society, Vol.7, No.2, 2004, pp. 157-175. 
7
 R. R. Krebs, J. K. Lobasz, Fixing the Meaning of 9/11: Hegemony, Coercion, and the Road to War in 
Iraq in Security Studies, Vol.16, No.3, 2007, pp. 409-451. 
8
 S. Coşar – M. Yeğenoğlu, ‘New Grounds for Patriarchy in Turkey? Gender Policy in the Age of AKP, in 
South European Society and Politics, Vol.16, No.4, 2011, pp. 555–573; D. Kandiyoti, The Gender Wars 
in Turkey: A Litmus Test of Democracy?, in The State of Democracy in Turkey Institutions, Society and 
Foreign Relations, Vol. 4, 2015, LSE Middle East Centre; A. Alnıaçık, Ö. Altan-Olcay, C. Deniz, F. 
Gökşen, Gender Policy Architecture in Turkey: Localizing Transnational Discourses of Women’s 
Employment, in Social Politics, Vol. 24, No.3, 2017, pp. 298-323; D. Cindoglu, D. Unal, Gender and 
Sexuality in the Authoritarian Discursive Strategies of ‘New Turkey’, in European Journal of Women’s 
Studies, SAGE, Vol.24, No.I, 2017, pp. 39-54; C. Erden – S. Koç, Woman in Turkish Political Discourse 
“Woman’s Representation in Political Celebration Messages on 8 March World Women’s Day”, in 
Journal of Current Researches on Social Sciences (JoCReSS), Vol.7, No.4, 2017, pp. 39-64; S. Çağatay, 
Women’s Coalitions beyond the Laicism-Islamism Divide in Turkey: Towards an Inclusive Struggle for 
Gender Equality?, in Social Inclusion, Vol.6, No.4, 2018; N. Mutluer, The Intersectionality of Gender, 
Sexuality, and Religion: Novelties and Continuities in Turkey during the AKP era, in Southeast European 
and Black Sea Studies, Vol.19, No.1, 2019, pp. 99-118. 
9
 B. Kesgin, Turkey’s Erdoğan, cit. 
10
 A. Günes Ayata, F. Tütüncü, Party Politics of the AKP (2002–2007) and the Predicaments of Women 
at the Intersection of the Westernist, Islamist and Feminist Discourses in Turkey, in British Journal of 
Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.35, No.3, 2008, pp. 363-384; U. Korkut, H. Eslen-Ziya, The Discoursive 
Governance of Population Politics: The Evolution of a Pro-birth Regime in Turkey, in Social Politics, 
Vol.23, No.4, 2016, pp. 555-575; N. Martin, The A.K. Party and the Kurds since 2014: A Discourse of 
Terror, in British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.45, No.4, 2018, pp. 543-558.  
11
 S. Aydın-Düzgit, De-Europeanisation through Discourse: A Critical Discourse Analysis of AKP’s 
Election Speeches, in South European Society And Politics, Vol.21, No.1, 2016, pp. 45-58; T. Erçetin – E. 
Erdoğan, How Turkey’s Repetitive Elections affected the Populist tone in the Discourses of the Justice 
and Development Party Leaders, in Philosophy & Social Criticism, Vol.44, No.4, 2018, pp. 382–398; Ş. 
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Certainly, this list is not exhaustive but illustrative to display diversity. However, to 
date there is no study looking at misogyny in the discourse of Erdoğan. 
One salient study investigated Erdoğan’s capacity to align his speeches to the place, 
time and culture of the audience
14
. Tekinalp’s research, in line with Hall’s hegemonic 
project that aspires to the remaking of commonsense
15
, exposed the ways that Erdoğan 
accomplished the framing of consent for his authoritarian ruling. The author clarified 
how Erdoğan used Islam and nationalism, which are the most sensitive cognitive mental 
frames of conservative people, to create a ‘commonsense consensus’ between two 
general elections in 2015
16
 while we witnessed a discursive change in the AKP to 
redefine ‘terrorist’ as any opponent of the AKP
17
.  
Güneş Ayata and Tütüncü have identified that the AKP increased the visibility of 
conservative and Islamist women, but only in terms of the headscarf debate and vote 
mobilisation
18
, whereas Coşar and Yeğenoğlu conceptualised this period as a new mode 
of patriarchy in the neoliberal, nationalist and religious discourse of the AKP
19
. In 
addition to the political context, recent evidence has suggested that the gender politics 
of the AKP has ensured their control of women’s bodies and sexualities which also 
feeds into their discourse
20
. Likewise, another study by Alnıaçık, et al. focused on 
transnational gender policy discourses and the distance of state institutions to abide.
21
 
The authors claimed that Turkey repeatedly poured money into programs to support the 
idea that care work is home-based and women’s responsibility, and to reproduce 
women’s marginalised positions in the labour market
22
. 
                                                                                                                                      
Tekinalp, How to Conceptualize a Culture of Support Through ‘Language Plus’ Presented at the Right 
Time to the Right Audience, in International Journal of Communication, No.12, 2018, pp. 4313-4331. 
12
 R. Karakaya Polat, Religious solidarity, historical mission and moral superiority: construction of 
external and internal ‘others’ in AKP’s discourses on Syrian refugees in Turkey, in Critical Discourse 
Studies, Vol.15, No.5, 2018, pp. 500-516; D. Onay-Coker, The representation of Syrian refugees in 
Turkey: a critical discourse analysis of three newspapers, in Continuum, Vol.33, No.3, 2019, pp. 369-
385. 
13
 B. Gümüş, A. Baran Dural, Othering Through Hate Speech: The Turkish-Islamist (V)AKIT Newspaper 
as a Case Study, in Turkish Studies, Vol.13, No.3, 2012, pp. 489-507; E. Özcan, Women’s Headscarves in 
News Photographs: A Comparison between the Secular and Islamic Press during the AKP Government in 
Turkey, in European Journal of Communication, Vol.30, No.6, 2015, pp. 698-713; S. Akyüz, F. Sayan-
Cengiz ‘Overcome your anger if you are a man’: Silencing Women’s Agency to Voice Violence Against 
Women, in Women’s Studies International Forum, No.57, 2016, pp. 1-10; V. Boztepe, Televizyon 
Haberlerinde Kadınlara Yönelik Şiddetin Temsili: Özgecan Aslan Cinayeti Üzerinden Bir İnceleme., in 
İstanbul Üniversitesi İletişim Fakültesi Dergisi, No.1, 2017, pp. 39-66; Y. Burul, H. Eslen-Ziya, 
Understanding ‘New Turkey’ Through Women’s Eyes: Gender Politcs in Turkish Daytime Talk Shows., in 
Middle East Critique, Vol.27, No.2, 2018, pp. 179-192; F. Avcı, A. Güdekli, Toplumsal Cinsiyet Ve 
Medya İlişkisi: Yazılı Basında Kadına Şiddet Ve Kadın Cinayetleri Haberleri Üzerine Bir Analiz, in 
International Journal of Cultural and Social Studies (IntJCSS), Vol.4, No.2, 2018, pp. 475-506. 
14
 Ş. Tekinalp, How to Conceptualize a Culture of Support, cit. 
15
 S. Hall, The Hard Road to Renewal: Thatcherism and the Crisis of the Left, Verso, London, p. 8. 
16
 Ş. Tekinalp, How to Conceptualize a Culture of Support, cit., p. 4314. 
17
 N. Martin, The A.K. Party and the Kurds since 2014: A Discourse of Terror, cit. 
18
 A. Günes Ayata, F. Tütüncü, Party Politics of the AKP (2002–2007), cit. 
19
 S.Coşar, M. Yeğenoğlu, New Grounds for Patriarchy in Turkey, cit. 
20
 D. Cindoglu, D. Unal, Gender and Sexuality, cit. 
21
 A. Alnıaçık, Ö. Altan-Olcay, C. Deniz, F. Gökşen, Gender Policy Architecture in Turkey: Localizing 
Transnational Discourses of Women’s Employment., in Social Politics, Vol.24, No.3, 2017, pp. 298-323.  
22
 Ibidem, p. 316. 
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By drawing on the concepts that the AKP instilled, such as yerli ve milli (homegrown 
and national) values, Mutluer applied a discourse analysis of the shifts in policies and 
public statements of governmental and non-governmental actors
23
. The author 
concluded that Erdoğan and the AKP use discourse on gender and sexuality as an 
instrument to control the «neoliberal distribution of conservative values adopted by 
family, community and market»
24
. Similarly, the study by Cindoglu and Unal suggested 
a complex patchwork of regulatory narratives on women’s sexualities generated by 
intertwining pro-Islamism, neoliberalism, authoritarianism and conservatism
25
. Whereas 
Özgür Keysan suggests that this is what makes the AKP’s power unique; its capacity to 
combine conservative and Islamic values with neoliberalism in political discourse and 
also in practice
26
.   
 
3. Theoretical and Methodological Framework  
 
The methodology of this study takes two approaches: it uses Manne’s logic of 
misogyny as the theoretical framework while applying FCDA to Erdoğan’s discourse. 
FCDA aims to unveil and defy discourses that still strengthen gendered social orders in 
various ways
27
. This study focuses on Erdoğan’s discourse on women after he became 
president in August 2014. The aim is to assess the extent of the patterns of misogyny 
that informs Erdoğan’s discourse on women’s rights, equality and agency. To address 
the research question empirically, data in the form of 27 speeches by Erdoğan and press 
releases of the presidency on behalf of Erdoğan are analysed. The data is extracted from 
the official website of the presidency of Turkey
28
. Initial research has verified that there 
is no press release or speech on the website of the presidency that acknowledges the 
International Day for the Elimination of VAW. However, Erdoğan gave speeches at the 
International Women and Justice Summits of KADEM
29 
that were organised in the 
same period, therefore these speeches are included in the analysis. The reason for 
focusing on these specific days is that they take place at a time when Erdoğan’s 
discourse predominantly focused on women rather than any other contemporary topic.  
Manne’s study
30
 encompasses the theoretical framework of the current study where I 
assess whether misogyny feeds Erdoğan’s discourse on women and if so, to what extent 
misogyny informs his discourse. Manne starts her theory by explaining how the 
                                              
23
 N. Mutluer, The Intersectionality of Gender, Sexuality, and Religion: Novelties and Continuities in 
Turkey during the AKP era, in Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol.19, No.1, 2019, pp. 99-
118.  
24
 Ibidem, p. 101.  
25
 D. Cindoglu, D. Unal, Gender and Sexuality, p. 40. 
26
 A. Özgür Keysan, Activism and Women’s NGOs in Turkey: Civil Society, Feminism and Politics, I.B. 
Tauris, London, 2019, p. 84. 
27
 M.M. Lazar, Feminist critical discourse analysis. in The Routledge Handbook of Critical Discourse 
Studies, John Flowerdew and John E. Richardson (eds.), Routledge, London, 2017, pp. 372-387. 
28
 https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/. 
29
 Women and Democracy Association (KADEM) is the biggest GONGO association in Turkey of which 
Erdoğan’s daughter is one of the founders. GONGOs are non-governmental organizations established by 
ruling regimes. They are loyal to the regime, and instrumental to promoting the ruling regime’s agenda at 
a local level. Compared to NGOs, GONGOs receive immense funding from the regime so they can reach 
a wider audience through events including nationwide campaigns and conferences. 
30
 K. Manne, Down Girl the Logic of Misogyny, cit.  
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standard definition of misogyny is fundamentally insufficient to explain misogyny in 
the real world. The standard definition of misogyny, a naïve conception says Manne, 
views misogyny as a physiological phenomenon in men because it considers that 
misogynists hate all or most women because they are women
31
. Manne opposes this, 
explaining that we cannot expect even deeply misogynistic men to hate all women 
because there are women in their lives who stick to patriarchal expectations, who 
amicably serve these misogynistic men. For example, a man can love his mother and 
still be a misogynist. Throughout her analysis, Manne revealed distressing (potentially 
even triggering) cases from real life, clarifying that misogyny is not a psychological 
phenomenon but a materialisation of social norms, expectations and consequences of 
the patriarchal order. Thus, «misogyny primarily targets women because they are 
women in a man’s world […] rather than because they are women in a man’s mind 
where that man is a misogynist»
32
. Stating it concisely, misogyny can be described as 
the «law enforcement branch of a patriarchal order, which has the overall function of 
policing and enforcing its governing ideology»
33
. 
Manne constructed a framework that understands misogyny in terms of what it does 
to women. One’s attitudes/behaviours count as misogynistic within a patriarchal social 
environment. To generalise: adults are insultingly likened to children, people to animals 
or even to objects. Infantilising and belittling, ridiculing, humiliating, mocking, slurring, 
vilifying, demonising, sexualising/desexualising, silencing, shunning, shaming, 
blaming, patronising, condescending, and other forms of treatment that are dismissive 
and disparaging in specific social contexts. This can also include violence and 
threatening behaviour. In other words, misogyny operates to keep women in line when 
they fail to «know their place»
34
. 
Moreover, Manne proposed the give/take model which offers a way to unify the 
phenomena. The model anticipates that cases of misogyny can be brought under two 
headings. Firstly, women are obliged to give feminine-coded goods and services to 
«someone or other, preferably one man at least insofar as he wants such goods and 
services from her»
35
. Secondly, women are prohibited from asking for masculine-coded 
goods from men as long as they want to receive or retain them
36
: 
 
«Hers to give (feminine-coded goods and services): attention, affection, admiration, 
sympathy, sex, and children (i.e., social, domestic, reproductive, and emotional labour); also 
mixed goods, such as safe haven, nurture, security, soothing, and comfort»  
 
versus 
 
«His for the taking (masculine-coded perks and privileges): power, prestige, public 
recognition, rank, reputation, honour, ‘face’, respect, money and other forms of wealth, 
hierarchical status, upward mobility, and the status conferred by having a high-ranking 
woman’s loyalty, love, devotion, etc.»  
                                              
31
 Idem, p.32. 
32
 Idem, p.64 (original emphasis). 
33
 Idem, p.63 (original emphasis). 
34
 Idem, p. 68. 
35
 K. Manne, Down Girl the Logic of Misogyny, p. 130. 
36
 Ibidem, (original emphasis). 
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The focus of Manne’s study is on Australia, the United Kingdom (UK) and the US. It 
offers an analysis of misogyny theoretically enlightening for studies looking at other 
parts of the world because it shows that misogyny in a social environment is 
metaphysically dependent on there being norms and expectations of a patriarchal 
nature
37
. Manne further explained that the framework she developed is indeed intended 
to be general, but that she deliberately focused on cultures in which she has been a 
political participant since she analyses culture and ideology
38
. Therefore, I argue here 
that the framework is applicable to analysing discourse in other patriarchal societies, 
including Turkey – an authoritarian (and gradually becoming Islamic) country, where I 
have been a political participant.  
FCDA specifically focuses on interpreting the interrelationship between gender, 
power and ideology
39
. The mission of FCDA is to study «how power and dominance are 
discursively produced and/or resisted in a variety of ways through textual 
representations of gendered social practices, and through interactional strategies of 
talk»
40
. Thus, the mission is not only to deconstruct discourse using the logic of 
misogyny as a framework, but also to analyse the relationship between discourse and 
patriarchy. Therefore, FCDA is selected as the research method of this study. 
So, discourse matters. Studying discourse mediates between society/culture/situation, 
cognition and discourse/language
41
. Lazar has argued that ideological assumptions are 
constantly re-enacted and circulated through discourse commonsensical and natural
42
. 
As a result, in studies of FCDA, the central concern focuses on discourses sustaining the 
patriarchal social order which can be defined as power relations that systemically 
privilege men as a social group and disadvantage, exclude and disempower women as a 
social group
43
. Discourse is ideological and socially consequential; it gives rise to power 
and also reproduces unequal power relations between women and men
44
. Thus, it is 
imperative to focus on Erdoğan’s discourse on women, and how and why it affects 
women’s rights, equality and agency. 
The data obtained in this study is in Turkish. The initial analysis included referencing 
every document in the data to include when, where, how and why the speech was 
produced. After initial coding, coding categories that have analytical significance were 
produced with the aim to identify how Erdoğan has used particular discursive 
                                              
37
 Idem, p. 67. 
38
 Idem, p. 26. 
39
 M.M. Lazar, Politicizing Gender in Discourse: Feminist Critical Discourse Analysis as Political 
Perspective and Praxis, in Feminist Critical Discourse Analysis: Gender, Power, and Ideology in 
Discourse, M.M. Lazar (ed.), Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2005, pp. 1-28. 
40
 Idem, p. 10. 
41
 R. Wodak, Editor’s Introduction: Critical Discourse Analysis – Challenges and Perspective, in Critical 
Discourse Analysis Volume I Concepts, History, Theory, SAGE, 2013, p. xxxii. 
42
 M.M. Lazar, Feminist Critical Discourse Analysis Relevance for Current Gender and Language 
Research, in The Handbook of Language, Gender and Sexuality, M. Meyerhoff,  J. Holmes (eds.), Wiley 
Blackwell, Hoboken, New Jersey, 2014, p. 186. 
43
 M.N. Lazar, Politicizing Gender in Discourse, cit., p. 5. 
44
 N. Fairclough, R. Wodak, Critical Discourse Analysis, in Discourse as Social Interaction, SAGE, 
London, 1997, pp. 258-60. 
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structures
45
. Through employing FCDA, the data is examined in terms of word order, 
metaphors, idioms, and vocabulary choice within the theoretical framework. The 
analysis of discourse fragments (like structures, procedures) and the findings are 
discussed next.  
 
4. How do the Patterns Emerge? 
 
The Turkish language is a left-branching, agglutinating language. New words are 
formed by attaching an affix to the right of a root, which can be a simple root or a 
combination of a root plus suffixes, referred to as a stem
46
. The main word order is 
subject-object-verb while the main word formation process involves suffixing 
morphology that is influenced by vowel harmony and other morphophonological 
processes
47
. This means that vowels in almost all suffices depend on the consonants or 
vowels that precede them
48
. For example, the plural suffix has two forms, -lar (as in 
kadın-lar “women”) and -ler (as in feminist-ler “feminists”). Erdoğan always uses 
possessive suffixes in addition to plural suffixes in his discourse.  
Possessive suffixes usually correspond to the six grammatical persons. A noun 
phrase marked with a possessive suffix is understood as denoting a person or thing that 
is possessed. The possessive suffix indicates only whether the possessor is 1st, 2nd or 
3rd person, singular or plural
49
. One interesting finding is that Erdoğan usually prefers 
to use 1st plural possessive suffixes when referring to women. This analysis revealed 
that Erdoğan addressed women 187 times using possessive suffixes. The grammatical 
structure of this is as follows
50
:  
(1)  Kadın-lar-ımız              
Woman-plural suffix-possessive1PL 
“our women” 
  
(2) a. Genç kız-lar-ımız                                 b.          Kız evlat-lar-ımız  
Young girl-plural suffix-possesive1PL                    Girl child-plural suffix-possesive1PL 
“our young girls”                                                              “our daughters” 
 
(3)  Anne-ler-imiz 
Mother-plural suffix-possessive1PL 
“our mothers” 
                                              
45
 G. R. Waitt, Doing Discourse Analysis, in Qualitative Research Methods in Human Geography, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2005, p. 182. 
46
 A. Göksel. C. Kerslake, Turkish: A Comprehensive Grammar, Routledge, New York, 2005, p. 43. 
47
 F. Braun, The Communication of Gender in Turkish., in Gender across Languages: The Linguistic 
Representation of Women and Men, Vol. I, M. Hellinger, H. Bussmann (eds.), John Benjamins Publishing 
Company, Amsterdam, 2001, pp. 283-310. 
48
 A. Göksel, C. Kerslake, Turkish: A Comprehensive Grammar. 
49
 Idem, p. 151. 
50
 As part of his populist discourse, Erdoğan uses possessive suffixes also in different contexts such as 
şehitlerimiz - our martyrs, babalarımız - our fathers, gençlerimiz - our young people. However, using ‘our 
fathers’, for instance, would have no consequence on men in a patriarchal society whereas using such 
rhetoric for women emphasises a relationship of possessiveness and causes immense impact on women’s 
rights, equality and agency. In other words, using such form when referring to women constitutes an 
action that is conductive to a social environment’s misogyny and, thus, cultivates patriarchy.  
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(4)  Hanım kardeş-ler-imiz  
Lady Sibling-plural suffix-possessive1PL “our lady siblings” 
 
Possessive suffixes emphasise the relation between people and things of a permanent 
nature or considered so by the subject. Interestingly, the Turkish language does not have 
any gender distinction in grammar (nor gender specific personal pronouns). However, 
patriarchy has been producing gender biases, gender roles and gender as a category that 
remains in the shadow of grammatical neutrality that is engrained in everyday life. In 
other words, the Turkish language seems structurally gender neutral while it is used to 
project patriarchy intrinsically.  
Patriarchy does not hold women as mindless things or objects. Rather it expects a 
woman to owe her human capacities to particular people such as men in her family (or 
his children). Hence, women always have to be somebody’s someone; sister, daughter, 
mother, grandmother conductive but seldom their own person
51
. Likewise, in Erdoğan’s 
discourse, this is also evident; women are always somebody’s someone. 
Further discussion of the findings is unfolded in the following two subsections 
focusing on patriarchy and othering. I have two aims in separating the discussion part. 
In the first subsection, I present how his discourse on concepts like culture, custom, and 
belief serve patriarchy. Following in the second, I unveil how this discourse feeds 
‘appropriate womanhood’, and categorises and marginalises some women. Both 
subsections originate from analytically significant coding categories
52
.  
 
4.1 Misogyny’s Nest: Patriarchy  
 
Patriarchy privileges men, creates hegemony over women and produces systemic 
inequalities based on gender. Patriarchy today, is so hegemonic that it does not appear 
as domination at all; it commonly seems «consensual and acceptable»
53
. 
It is worth starting by stressing that Erdoğan’s discourse on women’s rights does not 
derive from gender equality, because he does not believe in the equality of women and 
men
54
. Erdoğan is a creationist and he frequently refers to the teachings of Islam and the 
Quran when referring to women’s rights. He states that the point of departure must be 
gender justice, not equality, when it comes to women: 
 
«What do women need? Sometimes they say equality between women and men. The 
right way is equality among women and equality among men. However, what really 
matters is justice for women [...]. What women need is not equality, but rather equity, in 
other words, justice. You cannot place women and men on an equal footing; it is against 
their fıtrat [purpose of creation] because women’s fıtrat, nature and constitution are 
                                              
51
 K. Manne, Down Girl the Logic of Misogyny, cit., p.173.  
52
 G.R. Wait, Doing Discourse Analysis, in Qualitative Research Methods in Human Geography, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2005, pp. 163-191. 
53
 M.M. Lazar, Politicizing Gender in Discourse, cit., p.7. 
54
 Online archive of the newspaper Cumhuriyet, Buz gibi Sözler, 20 July 2010, 
http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/diger/164212/Buz_gibi_sozler.html. 
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different […] therefore we must adopt […] gender justice
55
 as our most important 
criterion, the most important point of reference»
56
. 
Holsti has stated that political statements aim to «persuade, justify, threaten, cajole, 
manipulate, evoke sympathy and support, or otherwise influence the intended 
audience»
57
. It is important to recall Holsti’s argument in discourse analysis because 
language use forms social identities, social relations and systems of knowledge and 
belief in a way that helps to shape such aspects of society and culture
58
, by creating 
consent. So, what does Erdoğan’s discourse aim to achieve? 
Patriarchy demands women’s subordination and oppression. It constructs a social 
environment that assigns gender roles and biases to ensure a hierarchy. It ensures that 
women internalise through means of education, religion, family and political discourse. 
Müftüler-Baç outlined the preliminary factors in Turkey that include patriarchy as the 
Mediterranean culture, Islam and Kemalism
59
 which comprises legal discrimination, 
economic inequality, social inequality (as intangible forms) and sexual harassment, 
assault, insult, battery, rape, virginity tests, torture, and murder at the most extreme (as 
tangible forms)
60
. Erdoğan did not refer to patriarchy in the data but he referred 356 
times to history, beliefs, culture, religion, Islam, (sacred) values
61
, civilisation, mores 
and traditions. Among these, religion, Islam and belief were mentioned a total of 143 
times (40 percent). While history is referred to the most, mores and traditions are 
referred to the least, albeit that these concepts together serve to shape the everyday life 
of the society.  
                                              
55
 The concept of ‘gender justice’ repeats the ‘gender equity’ discourse of the Vatican at the Beijing 
Conference in 1995 in: P. İlkkaracan, Vatikan'dan Kopya: Toplumsal Cinsiyet Adaleti [Copy from the 
Vatican: Gender Justice], in Kazete, comment posted January 2 2015, 
http://kazete.com.tr/makale/vatikandan-kopya-gundemsal-cinsiyet-adaleti_1013. 
56
R. T.  Erdoğan, Uluslararası Kadın Ve Adalet Zirvesinde Yaptıkları Konuşma (speech, November 24, 
2014), Presidency of the Turkish Republic, https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/2959/uluslararasi-
kadin-ve-adalet-zirvesinde-yaptiklari-konusma, 
57
 O. Holsti, Foreign Policy Viewed Cognitively, in The Structure of Decision, Robert Axelrod (ed.), 
Princeton University, Princeton, 1976, p. 43. 
58
 C.A.M. Gouveia, Assumptions about Gender, Power and Opportunity: Gays and Lesbians as 
Discursive Subjects in a Portuguese Newspaper, in Feminist Critical Discourse Analysis Gender, Power 
and Ideology in Discourse, M. M. Lazar (ed.), Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2005, pp. 229-250. 
59
 Kemalism: ‘The ideas and principles of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder and first president of the 
Turkish Republic, are termed Kemalism; Kemalism constitutes the official ideology of the state, and 
endured publicly unchallenged until the 1980s’ in Mete Tunçay, ‘Kemalism’, Oxford Islamic Studies 
Online, http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t236/e0440. 
60
 M. Müftüler-Baç, Turkish Women’s Predicament, in Women’s Studies International Forum, Vol.22, 
No.3, 1999, p. 305.  
61
 Values that are shared by the society (common values) is a vague concept that enables Erdoğan (along 
with other men who are in positions of power) to attract approval from various segments of the society. 
This vague concept generally has Islamic and conservative tones. A. Güneş-Ayata, G. Doğangün, Gender 
Politics of the AKP: Restoration of a Religio-conservative Gender Climate in Journal of Balkan and Near 
Eastern Studies, Vol.19, No.6, 2017, pp. 610-627. 
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Chart 1. Covert Patriarchy 
 
Such discursive utilisation reproduces the dominant patriarchal understanding of 
gender relations. These concepts reproduce norms and expectations of patriarchy in a 
social environment which misogyny depends on. In other words, Erdoğan utilises 
language to strengthen patriarchy. Gender, power and patriarchy are socially 
constructed
62
 and when these concepts are frequently reproduced they reshape the 
relations between individuals, as a part of the processes of cultural and historical 
reproduction
63
. This is palpable in how Erdoğan uses women as an instrument to create 
historical and cultural boundaries to separate the Turkish society from other societies. It 
can be illustrated briefly by Erdoğan’s declaration that women are in the trust of men on 
behalf of god. He claims that this depicts the importance given to being a woman, and 
that this is dignifying for women
64
. 
Erdoğan’s “complementarity” approach originates from gender binary, i.e. 
humankind can be divided into precisely two sexes, which is also a precondition for 
heteronormativity and an inherent part of many cultural systems:  
                                              
62
 M.M. Lazar, Politicizing Gender in Discourse, cit. 
63
 C.A.M. Gouveia, Assumptions about Gender, Power and Opportunity, cit. 
64
 R. T. Erdoğan, Dördüncü Muhtarlar Toplantısı’nda Yaptıkları Konuşma (speech, March 10, 2015), 
Presidency of Turkish Republic, https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/29791/dorduncu-muhtarlar-
toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma. 
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«Even though they [women and men] come from different fıtrat, they are integral parts of 
the same piece»65.  
 
«Once you remove one part, the other is not a half – it vanishes, that is how God created us, 
in a balance»66.  
 
Very often, he has stated that women and men are two sides of a medallion.
67
 
Interestingly, Erdoğan’s discourse on complementarity rejects sexism, however, the 
way he structures his discourse unfortunately does not reveal who the sexists are. The 
grammatical structure of Turkish permits null subjects, which means clauses can lack 
explicit subjects via adding plural suffixes (-ler, -lar) to verbs to create null subjects as 
in bakanlar (ones who look) and söyleyenler (ones who say).  
Erdoğan has claimed that he is against any kind of sexism, that sexist approaches do 
not comply with the values, history, and dynamics of social life in Turkey
68
. His 
approach to feminism and the fact that feminism rejects his complementarity approach 
could provide one possible explanation to whom Erdoğan refers. Feminists are sexists 
because they separate human beings as women and men as the quotes below suggest: 
 
«God created us as humans, the most honourable creature; all differences are beyond this 
line, below this. When you sort any difference above all, particularly sex, problems arise. 
Neither our belief, our culture nor our history would allow this»69. 
 
«Women and men are […] complementary […]. The ones who evaluate women and men 
only with a sexist approach, they miss the fact that they are human»70. 
 
«We will never stop working to change the approach of those who look at women and men 
through sexist glasses, the ones who forget that they are humans first»71.  
 
«The human being is the most honourable creature [...]. Any assault against women is 
against all humankind. With every femicide, all humankind is slaughtered. The ones who do not 
approach this issue through this point, have surrendered their mind to sexism»72. 
                                              
65
 R. T. Erdoğan, HAK-İŞ Dünya Kadın Günü Programında Yaptıkları Konuşma (speech, March 7, 2018), 
Presidency of the Turkish Republic, https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/91665/hak-is-dunya-kadin-
gunu-programinda-yaptiklari-konusma. 
66
 R.T. Erdoğan, Dördüncü Muhtarlar Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma (speech, March 10, 2015). 
67
 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, 'Dünya Kadınlar Günü Mesajı', (press release, March 7, 2018),  Presidency of 
the Turkish Republic, https://www.tccb.gov.tr/basin-aciklamalari/365/91660/dunya-
kadinlar-gunu-mesaji; R.T. Erdoğan, Dünya Kadınlar Günü Mesajı, (press release, March 7, 2019), 
Presidency of the Turkish Republic, https://www.tccb.gov.tr/basin-
aciklamalari/365/102317/dunya-kadinlar-gunu-mesaji. 
68
 R.T. Erdoğan, Dünya Kadınlar Günü Mesajı, (press release, March 7, 2018). 
69
 R.T. Erdoğan, Dördüncü Muhtarlar Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşm (speech, March 10, 2015). 
70
 R.T.  Erdoğan, 8 Mart Dünya Kadınlar Günü Resepsiyonu’nda Yaptıkları Konuşma, (speech, March 8, 
2016), Presidency of the Turkish Republic, https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/40095/8-mart-
dunya-kadinlar-gunu-resepsiyonunda-yaptiklari-konusma. 
71
 R.T. Erdoğan, Dünya Kadınlar Günü Mesajı, (press release, March 7, 2019). 
72
 R.T. Erdoğan, Dünya Kadınlar Günü Buluşması’nda Yaptıkları Konuşma, (speech, March 8, 2015), 
Presidency of the Turkish Republic, https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/29790/dunya-kadinlar-
gunu-bulusmasinda-yaptiklari-konusma. 
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Erdoğan has rejected the argument that VAW is a systematic problem that stems 
from patriarchy. Instead, he believes that VAW is an individual problem of psychopaths 
or perverts
73
. He has also emphasised that a real Muslim person would not engage in 
VAW
74
. Erdoğan believes that the aforementioned concepts like history and civilisation 
have no contribution to VAW at all. On the contrary, these concepts provide the answer: 
respecting women. He believes that history, civilisation, religion, etc. bring about 
respect to women and that is the solution for VAW. Moreover, his imputative discourse 
accuses the people who see traces of VAW in these concepts as trying to vilify the 
nation’s values and beliefs
75
. His understanding is in line with the standard definition of 
misogyny that views misogyny as a matter of the psychology of men
76
. However, 
neither VAW nor misogyny is a psychological phenomenon. They are about social 
norms, patriarchal oppression and expectations, which are very present in Turkish 
society.  
In addition, Erdoğan has denied that there is gender discrimination in Turkey
77
. He 
defends fıtrat, complementarity and gender justice while continuing to glorify culture, 
values, religion and civilisation. He has accused gender equality efforts as «torn from 
the reality» of the country, stressing that gender justice is the necessary approach for 
family (and women’s) issues
78
. 
It is interesting to observe Erdoğan’s rejection of gender equality, and the frequency 
of his references to concepts like history and culture in order to form a different 
understanding of women’s rights, i.e. humanising women. However, as discussed 
earlier, humanising women creates no progress for women’s rights and agency. Rather, 
it means acceptance of ‘hers-to-give’ capacities at the state level. The alarming number 
of femicides portrays the point that his approach does not yield any progress
79
. Besides, 
his discourse on women’s rights excludes feminism; he intentionally avoids saying 
women’s rights, and focuses merely on the human status of women:   
 
«I salute your fight to use your rights that derive from your status as a human being. In our 
civilisation, our belief, our culture, people are not dealt with according to their sex but their 
status as human beings because with us, humans are the most honourable creatures…There is no 
need for anything else to protect women when women are approached as human beings»80. 
 
                                              
73
 R.T. Erdoğan, HAK-İŞ Dünya Kadın Günü Programında Yaptıkları Konuşma (speech, March 7, 2018). 
74
 R.T. Erdoğan, Uluslararası Kadın Ve Adalet Zirvesinde Yaptıkları Konuşma (speech, November 24, 
2014).  
75
 R.T. Erdoğan, HAK-İŞ Dünya Kadın Günü Programında Yaptıkları Konuşma (speech, March 7, 2018). 
76
 K. Manne, Down Girl the Logic of Misogyny, cit., p.32. 
77
 R.T. Erdoğan, Cumhurbaşkanı Sayın Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’ın III. Uluslararası Kadın ve Adalet 
Zirvesi Açılış Konuşması, (speech, November 23, 2018), KADEM, http://kadem.org.tr/cumhurbaskani-
sayin-recep-tayyip-erdoganin-iii-uluslararasi-kadin-ve-adalet-zirvesi-acilis-konusmasi/. 
78
 Ibidem. 
79
 BİA, independent communication network, monitors male violence in Turkey, 
http://bianet.org/english/gender/134394-bianet-is-monitoring-male-violence. 
80
 R.T.  Erdoğan, HAK-İŞ 5. Uluslararası Kadın Emeği Buluşması’nda Yaptıkları Konuşma, (speech, 
March 7, 2016), Presidency of the Turkish Republic, https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/40060/hak-
is-5-uluslararasi-kadin-emegi-bulusmasinda-yaptiklari-konusma. 
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Erdoğan has insisted that women are humans and that once they are treated as 
humans, gender justice will be achieved. He has frequently underlined women’s 
humanity whilst at the same time stressing that men’s and men’s fıtrat are different; 
therefore, they are not, and cannot be, equal. In contrast to popular views on misogyny, 
which sees women as sub-human, non-persons or things, misogyny in effect considers 
women as humans but « all too human»
81
. So, what does this concept of fıtrat involve 
for women? They are “human givers”. Women are socially positioned to owe their 
human capacities which are defined by feminine-coded human goods and services to 
men, the latter who are entitled to receive these goods.  
Erdoğan has often highlighted that respecting women is part of the values, traditions 
and history of Turkey
82
 and praises motherhood as the highest possible rank for a 
woman
83
. Even though he does not define what he means by respect, in his speeches he 
generally refers to women in terms of responsibilities, whether family, domestic work, 
motherhood, or as the first teacher of children
84
. There is no reference to women’s 
agency or individuality in his speeches which ultimately feed a misogynistic social 
environment: «Women to be in the trust of men on behalf of god»
85
; «Our women that 
always have a special place in our hearts; that are the essential pillar of structure of our 
family and society»
86
; «All women who instil hope in humankind with their self-
sacrifice, their love»
87
. 
Furthermore, Erdoğan has constructed the discourse on appropriate womanhood in a 
way that embraces propriety and subordination. Such a role for women is in line with 
Manne’s theory that recognises misogyny in terms of what it does to women. As the law 
enforcement branch of patriarchy, misogyny’s function is to police and enforce its 
governing ideology
88
. Correspondingly, Erdoğan’s discourse brings about the norms 
and expectations of patriarchy from women; his discourse on appropriate womanhood 
enforces the norms and expectations of patriarchy upon which misogyny in a social 
                                              
81
 K. Manne, Down Girl the Logic of Misogyny, cit., p.169. 
82
 R.T. Erdoğan, Dünya Kadınlar Günü Mesajı, (press release, March 7, 2019). 
83
 R.T.  Erdoğan, Uluslararası Kadın Ve Adalet Zirvesinde Yaptıkları Konuşma (speech, November 24, 
2014); R.T. Erdoğan, Gaziantep Toplu Açılış ve Temel Atma Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma, (speech 
March 7, 2015), Presidency of the Turkish Republic, 
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(speech, March 8, 2016). Besides, again in 2016, Erdoğan said that a woman who rejects motherhood, 
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incomplete. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/06/turkish-president-Erdoğan-childless-
women-deficient-incomplete. 
84
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(speech, March 8, 2016); R.T. Erdoğan, Anneler Günü Mesajı, (press release, May 12, 2018), Presidency 
of the Turkish Republic, https://www. https://www.tccb.gov.tr/basin-aciklamalari/365/93922/anneler-
gunu-mesaji.  
85
 R.T. Erdoğan, Gaziantep Toplu Açılış ve Temel Atma Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma, (speech March 7, 
2015). 
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environment is metaphysically dependent
89
. Moreover, such heteronormativity and 
expectation of family as the heterosexual union of women and men, restricts the very 
small space that the LGBT+ community has in Turkey. In such a misogynistic social 
environment, women are expected of “hers-to-give”
90
 capacities, i.e. feminine-coded 
goods and services, are highly detectable in Erdoğan’s discourse:  
 
«Women of Anatolia are like soil; they are stoic, maker, constructive, and always survivors. 
[...] She knows how to feed her family and raise her children in harsh conditions, she works 
tooth and nail and produces. She instils us with hope»91. 
 
«A woman knows that she has to bring food to the table in any conditions and acts 
accordingly. She hides the distress she suffers, and protects her family, keeps her family 
together»92.  
 
«Humankind would not survive if it weren’t for you, your self-sacrifice, your attention, 
affection, efforts, fights. Therefore, I salute all stoic women of Anatolia and Thrace»93.  
 
Of course, there are women who do not comply with Erdoğan’s appropriate 
womanhood. They demand his-for-the-taking that women are prohibited from. They 
violate their “place”; they disobey patriarchy. Such women are likely to be labelled as 
«greedy, corrupt, illicitly entitled, and out of order»
94
. However, misogyny ensures 
women stick to their assigned patriarchal roles; women’s tasks are not only performing 
emotional, social, domestic, sexual, and reproductive labour – they must do so in a 
loving and caring manner or enthusiastic spirit, patriarchal norms and expectations have 
to operate on the down-low.
95
 Erdoğan usually underlines that women have supported 
him since the early days of his political career, during his candidacy for mayor of 
Istanbul in the 1990s
96
: 
 
«Since my candidacy for the major of Beyoğlu District in 1989, any area in politics that I 
took responsibility, I walked the path with our women. During my days as mayor in Istanbul 
metropolitan municipality, our women were at the forefront of social events […]. I thank my 
lady siblings who were there for me in every struggle I had, who have supported my every 
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 Idem, p. 67. 
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 K. Manne, Down Girl the Logic of Misogyny, cit., p. 130. 
91
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achievement for approximately 40 years […]. Like in that saying ‘it needs a woman’s touch’, 
Tayyip Erdoğan has survived until these days thanks to women’s touch»97. 
 
But this raises the question of what role did these women play? Were they politicians 
involved in decision-making? Did we see an increase in the number of women 
politicians in the AKP? In their earlier work, Günes Ayata and Tütüncü revealed that 
women in the AKP had very little impact on increasing representation, or changing the 
rhetoric and programme, as well as not being close to positions of power within the 
organisational structure
98
. 
Following the general election in November 2017, the AKP had only 34 women out 
of its 316 parliamentarians, accounting for just 10.76 percent
99
. Erdoğan has claimed 
that the AKP has 4.5 million women members
100
 in its women’s branch, but what do 
they do? Do they have any authority in the AKP? As women are human givers of moral 
support and attention, not recipients
101
, women in the AKP are also responsible for 
providing support, affection, admiration, and sympathy - especially before elections: 
 
«My lady siblings, I have a request. The election on March 31st is crucial. I want my lady 
siblings to get in every house until the election day…Ladies, are you ready to get in each and 
every house and reach every heart? […] My lady siblings, are you going to help the AKP that 
has always been there for you to break a record in the election?»102.  
 
4.2 Alienating feminism, othering feminists  
 
According to Young, discourse is both constituted by, and ensures the reproduction 
of, the social system through forms of selection, exclusion and domination
103
. If we 
look at how Erdoğan uses forms of selection, exclusion and domination in his discourse 
on othering women, we see that misogyny joins forces with these forms. Manne 
explains that misogyny works via regular social-norm enforcement mechanisms, 
moralism, and other negative character-level generalisations, hierarchical social moves, 
and similar
104
.  
Othering in Erdoğan’s discourse not only comprises women but any (hypothetical or 
real) opposition because of the grammatical structure of the Turkish language, because 
he chooses to use subjects in the form of pronouns in his discourse. Göksel and 
Kerslake define pronouns as expressions that are used to refer to people, things or states 
or affairs that have been previously mentioned, whose referents are obvious from the 
context or whose content is only partially specified
105
. However, the way Erdoğan 
structures his discourse does not allow for identifying the referents of pronouns. Since 
these pronouns are generally used in negative connotation to accuse or alienate, it is 
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reasonable to consider that this is why he does not refer directly to the people he means, 
i.e. whoever does not agree with his politics on the matters of the speech. To clarify, he 
regularly uses simple personal pronouns like: they (onlar) and someone (birisi); 
demonstrative pronouns (deriving from demonstrative determiners) such as these/those 
[people] (bunlar/onlar); pronominalised determiners as subjects like some of 
them/some people (bazıları); a noun phrase containing a quantifier: several (circles) 
(birtakım çevreler); and impersonal pronouns which can be negative, positive or 
interrogative ones (kimse). Occasionally he refers to feminists, media, opposition, and to 
Europe, the EU or the West directly (which is not in terms of geography but as 
pronouns with negative connotation in anti-Western discourse).  
 
 
Chart 2. ‘Othering’ in Discourse 
 
The analysis reveals a pattern of anti-Western and anti-feminist discourse in 
Erdoğan’s discourse. Initially, he mentions women living in Turkey before moving to 
women in conflict zones (Syria, Palestine), and he justifies Turkish army operations 
through a discourse on supporting «the oppressed» (including women). Then he 
underlines the numbers of refugees in Turkey and how the West does not care. Through 
an accusing discourse, Erdoğan also claims that feminists in the West are not concerned 
with women in conflict zones, and blames them as ignorant people, ergo, they are not 
actual women’s rights defenders:  
 
«There is no point for the ones who are deaf to their pain and tears to discuss women’s 
rights, human rights […]. We know that those people are not actually bothered with women, 
children, victims or the oppressed. Their trouble is something else. We cannot look at this 
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matter like they do or behave like they do. Our belief and history would not allow such 
coarseness, unjustness, immorality»106. 
«We witnessed the crocodile tears shed after tens of thousands of women and children were 
lost in dark Mediterranean waters. How could we believe that those who do not weep in sincere 
settings are advocates of women’s rights? Can they be advocates of women’s rights? They are 
just showpeople; they are absolutely not advocates for women’s rights. Isn’t calling for 
women’s rights a great lie of those who do not mention the women who were the main victims 
of the tragedies in the Balkans, in the Caucasus in the last quarter century?»107. 
 
Modernisation (Europeanisation or Westernisation) had been the main agenda of the 
Turkish Republic since its creation in 1923. However, Erdoğan has been utilising a 
discourse on “New Turkey”
108
 that estranges from Western values and democracy. He 
insists that gender equality, as a western concept, causes a new kind of slavery for 
women: 
 
«You cannot achieve any result if you try to cover our society with a different culture’s 
perception of women»109. 
 
«I believe that women, before anyone else, will oppose an understanding under the name of 
‘equality’ that exposes women to any kind of exploitation and abuse»110.  
 
«We put up this fight for our women because they deserve a life worthy of their human 
character, not a modern order of slavery that leads them to a new [kind] of slavery under the 
name of being liberated»111. 
 
«We see that several circles persistently annihilate whatever makes women ‘women’ – their 
differences, beauties, privileges – in the name of so-called emancipation […]. This dark 
mentality that brings whatever is foreign to this land and offers it as womanhood; that which 
humiliates women’s beliefs and appearances is the enemy of women… What they understand of 
liberating women is making women slaves to their ideology, their world. The ones who call 
freedom the act of tearing women from women’s families, neighbourhood, society, values, 
render women unguarded so that they can exploit women’s labour and body, and [they] aim for 
our next generations»112.  
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Even though Erdoğan generally uses demonstrative pronouns and impersonal 
pronouns, here he implies West/Europe/EU. Besides, he accuses gender equality of 
being foreign to Turkey and the product of a dark mentality that exposes women to 
exploitation and abuse.  
In summary, Erdoğan’s discourse on women embraces women as humans, and 
focuses on fıtrat, gender justice and complementarity as the most appropriate means for 
his point of origin which are concepts like history, civilisation, and belief. Such 
discourse completely rejects equality, individuality and agency of women. It also 
dismisses feminist activism that accepts patriarchy is served by the very same concepts 
which Erdoğan defends. So, what happens to these women? 
 
«Anyone who tries to justify VAW with our belief, culture, or traditions is fooling 
themselves. No one should dare to cover this violence using our sacred values. Likewise, no one 
should dare to attribute these wrongs to family institution under the name of ‘defender of 
women’s rights»113. 
 
«We never pay attention to marginal [people] whose raison d'être is exploitation; whose goal 
is nothing but battling against the nation’s and religion’s values»114. 
 
They are alienated. Even if Erdoğan claims that he defends all women’s rights
115
, his 
discourse proves that he divides the fight of appropriate women and others, i.e., 
feminists who take equality as their point of origin and refuse to provide hers-to-give: 
 
«Humankind has to give women their due value for its future’s sake. The way we defend the 
oppressed against tyrants all around the world, we also defend those women who fight for 
justice, for their honour, dignity, and rights until the end»116. 
 
«Our religion [Islam] has defined a position for women: Motherhood. Motherhood is 
something else, beyond everything, an unattainable position. Some can understand this, others 
cannot. You cannot explain this to feminists because they do not accept the concept of 
motherhood, that’s their trouble. However, the ones who understand are plenty for us. We 
continue our journey with those»117. 
 
Misogyny is not against all women. Misogyny targets rule-breakers: if women 
deviate from patriarchal norms and expectations, they are punished. On the one hand, 
when women do not perform their task, or they ask for masculine-coded goods, women 
face subtly hostile, threatening, and punitive norm-enforcement mechanisms from life 
threatening violence to subtle social signals of disapproval
118
. On the other hand, while 
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women that disobey the patriarchy are punished, women who abide are rewarded
119
. 
Hence, Erdoğan decides to continue his journey of ruling the country with these women 
only. When Erdoğan associates women with maternal functionality, and divides women 
as appropriate and not (i.e., marginal), women’s NGOs often declare their discomfort
120
 
because his discourse feeds into the misogynistic social environment against women.   
Manne defines an action as misogynistic inasmuch as it is a product of, and 
conductive to, a social environment’s misogyny
121
, but how does Erdoğan’s discourse 
on othering feminists reconcile with the misogynistic social environment? Because a 
social environment is misogynistic for a subset of women where they face «hostility of 
a kind that services to police and enforce gendered norms and expectations» within 
patriarchal order
122
. Manne’s give/take model sheds light on what misogyny 
encompasses: various acts, from harm (verbal attacks to murder) to enforcement of 
practices in countless domains such as sex, motherhood, and man’s proprietary spaces 
and positions
123
. Furthermore, misogyny involves common hostile themes like revenge, 
blame, resentment, guilt, punishment, betrayal, mistrust, hierarchical jostling, and many 
forms of shaming, disgusted, and ‘ousting’ behaviour
124
. In Erdoğan’s discourse on 
othering women, patterns are discernible; the good things that appropriate women do, 
the bad things other/feminist women do. In doing so, Erdoğan’s othering discourse 
aggravates the misogynistic social environment in various forms especially against the 
inappropriate women who are «the enemies of the nation».  
 
«All we have now is the nuclear family. Some people cannot even tolerate that, they pursue 
methods, means to detract children away from families immediately. We will never allow such 
sort of a calamity»125.  
 
«Some people perseveringly depict our mothers, our women inaccurately. Separating 
womanhood from the skill of motherhood means taking away her biggest privilege, it means 
disregarding her natural role as a teacher. Sometimes I say ‘have at least three children’ and 
some people get uncomfortable. Do you know why they feel uncomfortable? Because they are 
the enemies of this nation; that is why»126. 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
Speech is a mechanism through which unjust hierarchies persevere and thrive
127
 
because language helps to reproduce and maintain existing social identities, social 
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relations and systems of knowledge and belief of societies
128
. It is possible to 
manipulate the masses through the usual forms of ideological discourse, for example 
emphasising good things we do and bad things they do
129
. Fairclough has emphasised 
that discourses are «projective, imaginaries, representing possible worlds which are 
different from the actual world, and tied into projects to change the world in particular 
directions»
130
. In other words, Fairclough suggests that discourse might has 
transformative effect. Accordingly, Erdoğan’s discourse on women has become an 
important tool to reproduce and strengthen the patriarchal social order and patriarchal 
understanding of gender relations.  
In Turkey, an authoritarian turn on the civil society discourse has begun following 
the 2011 general election
131
. A notable example of how Erdoğan’s discourse on women 
has changed accordingly is the abortion right of women. Back in 2012, Erdoğan 
declared that «Each abortion is one Uludere»
132
. Here, he refers to the Roboski 
Massacre when the Turkish military murdered 34 Kurdish civilians in an air strike near 
the Iraqi border
133
. Wodak explained this kind of structure in discourse as 
recontextualization
134
. Erdoğan takes an argument out of context (decontextualization) 
and subsequently restates it in a new context so that it acquires new meaning. Even 
though legislation on abortion has not changed, the Turkish Ministry of Health has 
removed the code for abortion from the online entry forms of public hospitals, thereby 
effectively declassifying abortion as a medical practice in these hospitals
135
. Of course, 
hospitals might be doing this under coercion, but it still demonstrates that they have 
opted into the discourse even though there has been no amendment in the law. Further, 
Cindoglu and Unal support the point that the discursive regulation of women’s bodies 
and sexualities is now a major tool for sustaining the hegemonic character of current 
political rule in Turkey
136
.    
The distinction of this study is that it focuses on discourse from a theoretical 
framework of logic of misogyny using FCDA as a research method. Misogynist 
exploitation can work together in different ways
137
. However, this study has shown that 
Erdoğan’s discourse on women are informed by misogyny in two forms: reproducing 
patriarchy through gendered norms and values, and alienating some women. Since 
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patriarchy is misogyny’s governing ideology, misogyny materialises as an amalgam of 
social norms, expectations and consequences in patriarchal social order. In view of that, 
when Erdoğan repeatedly refers to concepts including «history», «civilisation», and 
«belief» in his discourse on women, he continually reproduces a patriarchal 
understanding of gender relations and manipulates the masses. A likely explanation is 
the importance of repetition for propaganda. In his classic book on the theory of 
propaganda, Chakotin explains that repeating the same idea, the same injunction, 
always in the same form over a relatively prolonged period, acts on emotions and 
shapes conditioned reflexes so that repetition creates a state of mental fatigue in the 
masses favouring subjugation to the will of that political leader
138
.  
The first major finding of this analysis is that Erdoğan’s discourse on women’s 
humanity and appropriate womanhood substantiates Manne’s give/take model. In his 
discourse, it is evident that women are too human and their humanity and their 
personhoods are owed to men (and children) in the form of social, domestic, 
reproductive, and emotional labour. Erdoğan’s speeches provide sufficient examples to 
prove the existence of patterns of misogyny within this framework. We see that 
women’s humanity is implied through their obligation of providing hers-to-give. In 
other words, Erdoğan’s discourse is in line with what misogyny does to women, and 
enforces patriarchy on women. In this context, I would like to underline that women 
have parallel responsibilities in the AKP as well: they provide loyalty, love and 
devotion (especially during pre-election times) to Erdoğan, but they do not obtain 
power, prestige, rank, or hierarchical status because those are his-for-the-taking
139
.  
The second major pattern of misogyny in Erdoğan’s discourse is how he utilises his 
discourse to alienate some women who defy patriarchy and their given roles. Misogyny 
retaliates against this class of girls/women, in one way or another, because they violate 
their “place”. In this regard, Erdoğan completely dismisses them because they accept 
gender equality as their starting point, and reject fıtrat, complementarity. They 
challenge patriarchal gender roles which conflicts with Erdoğan’s discourse on founding 
«a new understanding of women’s rights» consistent with «our history», «our culture», 
«our civilisation», and «our religion», which comprise the actual origins of historical 
gender bargain (see chart 1).  
This analysis has verified that Erdoğan alienates feminists in his discourse. He 
segregates women as appropriate, whose fight he supposedly supports, and others, 
whose fight he is against. Thus, he obtains an anti-feminist (and anti-Western) approach 
when he disputes feminism. However, the way he structures his discourse generally 
does not allow one to identify the referents of pronouns as he often prefers not to use 
overt subjects (see chart 2). In the data, Erdoğan refers directly to feminists only one 
time. The rest of the data reveals that he prefers to use personal, demonstrative or 
impersonal pronouns in negative connotation (to accuse or alienate).  
To conclude, this study has aimed to expand existing research on misogyny to an 
authoritarian regime, and to assess the extent of misogyny that feeds Erdoğan’s 
discourse on women’s rights, equality and agency. The study has shown that Erdoğan 
rejects gender equality that «derives from the dark mentality of the West, a stance that 
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diverges from reality»
140
. He perceives that women are in the trust of men, and 
fanatically defends that women have their own fıtrat to follow. The study has also 
shown that misogyny does not mean hating all women, and it has further detected 
patterns of misogyny in Erdoğan’s ‘othering’ discourse. Thus, the patterns of misogyny 
are vastly evident in Erdoğan’s discourse on women’s agency, equality and their civil, 
political, economic, social and cultural rights in line with Manne’s “logic of misogyny” 
and give/take model. 
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